MR. BFRY BREAKS DOWN YOUR WORLD

Ok this is the 2nd of a series of emails I wrote, but 95% of this should make sense even without the other e-mail. In the first e-mail, written about the time Hamas was elected to lead the Palestinian government, I talked of my opinion that despite all of Hamas's problems, it was actually a welcome move away from Fatah, who had several decades to put its constituents first but failed ot do so. This e-mail, below, was written shortly after the e-mail being cited here.

I started one place and ended up in another, but I hope you all enjoy this. Or, to quote Bilbo Baggins: "It's a dangerous business, Frodo, going out of your door," he used to say. "You step into the Road, and if you don't keep your feet, there is no knowing where you might be swept off to."

Hello all, I believe an explanation is in order. I was really angry that night about a lot of things I had read in the news, and had had a few beers with my roommates, and while that joke was amusing it just set me off. I've just been getting sick of bad decisions made by our government, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and Israel, and I just seen innocent Americans, Iraqis (there is no REAL Iraqi gov't, not yet), Israelis and Palestinians suffering as a result.

First of all, I want to make sure that that it is clear that that was in no way meant to be viewed as a "pro-Hamas" e-mail. I was trying to make several distinctions. To be fair to Fatah, democracy and organized states are a new concept in many parts of the Middle East. I just got finished reading this amazing book: http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?z=y&endeca=1&isbn=0801873061&itm=3

Below is the review from BN.com

Ok, this is me (Brian) again: At first glace it may seem obscure, but until recently it has been the # 2 bestselling in the ancient history category at bn.com, Barnes&Nobles' website. It is now #3. It has been up there selling that well for months. Its bargain price and its brilliance are just too much of a powerful combination. It's all about the interaction and mutual influence between Rome and the Barbarian cultures (mostly Germanic, Celtic, and the Steppe peoples, the Jews could hardly have been considered barbarians at the time, so sorry guys they are not covered, they were too advanced). What is truly mind blowing is how similar Rome's early expansion and then imperial dominance is to our own history, and how similar they were as a superpower to us as a superpower. I wouldn't have thought as much at first, but the author simply marshals too much evidence. And he doesn't usually make the connection to us: it’s just obvious. But anyway, even at its height the Roman Empire often relied on familial client-patron relationships: There were hardly organized governments among the barbarians, so foreign policy often relied on Rome dealing with a warlord who was powerful enough to guarantee adherence to Rome's treaties and interests; if a candidate wasn't powerful enough to guarantee this adherence, then Rome propped them up so that they could, and it’s terribly ironic that it was the Romans doing this that caused the different barbarian peoples to coalesce around a single leader and become the Franks, the Goths, the Alemanni...; the "barbarian nations" would have stayed just simple and chaotic, disparate tribes without the patronage of Rome and the Roman desire to see a strong man in charge of a designated area, or group of people.

Think about all our actions in South America during the cold war, from Somoza to Pinochet to Fujimori, and before that, Batista in Cuba. Think of the Saudi Royal Family (really, what kind of a "nation" is Saudi Arabia?) Think today about Musharaaf: a perfect example. He is a warlord, we have no real relationship with Pakistan and its many different tribes, we operate wholly through Gen. Musharaaf, and we help to keep his regime in power to ensure stability. Despite the popular image, Rome was largely peaceful after its early centuries of expansion; after Augustus and his immediate successors in the first century AD, the Borders of the Empire stayed pretty much the same, much like America's borders after Manifest Destiny had placated the "barbarian" native American tribes, after we had taken half of Mexico by force, stayed pretty much the same. (Think of Spain, and North Africa as the early expansion past the Appalachians, to the Mississippi; greater Greece, and eastern Turkey as Mexico, the rest of Turkey, Syria/Palestine/Judea, as the rest of the Great Plains up to the Rockies and the older settlements on the West Coast, and Egypt and Pannonia [the Balkans] as the far West, the rest of West Coast and the Southwest. Sure, there was some late expansion (Britain, Dacia [above the Danube], parts of the German frontier, some parts the Middle East like Mesopotamia/Iraq for Rome, and Puerto Rico, the Phillippines and Cuba, Hawaii and Alaska and all the Pacific territories retained after world War II for us) and even Rome withdrew from many areas it had expanded into like Dacia, Armenia, Mespotamia, the Black sea at its height, just as we pulled back from Cuba, Okinawa, the Phillipines, Panama Afghanistan/Iraq?...).

The cultural and societal similarities are what really blows your mind, though, in the book, but the point is this: that while it had its expansionist phases like we did, Rome was largely peaceful after it reached its peak, and usually only ended up fighting wars (with the exception of on-and-off Parthia/Persia, ironically West vs. East) when a new generation of Barbarian leaders in one particular area no longer decided to play by the rules set up in past generations between Rome and the affected area. This was usually in the Germanic areas but also in the Balkans and in Britain. Rome often found it had to renegotiate new treaties when new leaders emerged, and war would come about if the leader was not willing to give Rome what it wanted; Going back to Musharaaf, when he is gone in Pakistan, we will have to do much the same thing: renegotiate a new relationship when a new warlord emerges, and war may or may not ensue depending on the interests of both. Like our future and current wars, (think Saddam and Iraq too, actually) these were not wars of expansion for Rome, nor will they be wars of expansion for us: once a friendly dependable government was set up, Rome almost always withdrew its troops, occasionally maintaining a few forts or outposts deep in enemy territory; think of our Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan today. There really was no Afghan nation, nor is there now, the difference is that we placed a leader in charge whom we believe will be strong enough to ensure our interests are maintained, and already most of our troops are out of there. It was similar for Marcus Aurelius fighting the Germanic Marcomanni (as depicted in the opening of the movie Gladiator).

Rome gave so much power to these local rulers compared to what they had before interaction with Rome, that the borders of the direct Empire were often meaningless: Rome never imposed its culture or way of life on people, it’s just that both were so attractive that people all over Rome's orbit were voluntarily drawn into it. Our border with Mexico, our relationship with Japan, are very similar cases to Rome's frontiers: American and Roman culture mixed with the local culture so that direct annexation was no longer necessary to maintain power and influence. And much like our relationships with our Allies, Roman frontier neighbors and client states received much, much more aid and stimulus coming from Rome than they paid in tribute to Rome; it was enough for Rome, like us, to reap the economic and status rewards.

ANYWAY, going back to the beginning, and my last email: Arafat was a petty tribal chieftain in many ways, operating in the same ways that many of the petty Germanic warlords did with Rome: he, like the Germanics of Rome’s time, took the $$$ aide and newfound position of status that Rome/America has elevated him/them to, and distributed the wealth and power among his followers and, to a lesser degree, to his people. The patron-client relationships between Israel/the EU/Russia/America/the UN and Arafat on one level, and the personal network that he set up which became known as Fatah, were very powerful, but only as powerful as the leader, Arafat. When he died, and even before then, the US saw a need to reassess the situation and put up a new ruler, which we may find more difficult now with Hamas in charge. So to be fair to Arafat, he was the latest in a long line of patron-client relationships. The "Palestinian people" much like the "Marcomanni" or the "Germans" didn't really exist until Rome or America propped up a leader and said "you are in charge of your people." In Rome's case it could take centuries or decades for this group of people to think of itself as what it was called by Rome. In other words, the labels "Marcomanni" and "German" for the Romans, and the names "Palestinian" and "Saudi" and dare I say "Iraqi" for us Americans, had much more meaning for us and the Romans as a convenient way to label and organize people we deal/dealt with than for the people so being labeled.

Where Arafat can be judged, and judged harshly, is that he may have started in that old patron-client era, but now in the age of mass media, he could have risen to the task, was aware of what could have been done, and could have put his people first. But he never did: Fatah served to empower him and itself. Just like in Roman times, such leaders may have been popular (if they were too oppressive they were often deposed) but at their passing, the real problems would surface and turmoil would ensue. If Rome did not intervene directly, it had one of its clients intervene or it found a new leader who could guarantee stability. We are now doing the same thing in Palestinian Territories. Later in the Roman Empire, select allies occasionally had Roman arms and equipment, much like Israel does from us. And though the client would intervene, it was an extension of Rome's arm intervening for mutual interests. How different is Israel, intervening with M16's, F-16's, and Abrams tanks?

Back to Hamas: what inspires (in comparison to Fatah) and abhors about the group, this group that could, 50/50, be better or worse than Fatah, is interesting. The election for the Palestinians was a referendum on the status quo: continue the old, ridiculously corrupt patron-client networks of Fatah or reject that way of governance in lieu of an alternative with the people's interests at heart. Hamas has two faces: the Islamic Charity started decades ago by students in Egypt to care for their Palestinian Arab brothers, which has done a better job providing for the Palestinian people than Arafat's Fatah ever did, even while Fatah was in charge, and the terror group that sends suicide bombers into Israeli discos.

What is reassuring is that Hamas has dramatically reigned in its militant arm in the past year: attacks against Israelis are way down from the beginning of the Intifada. There is too much chaos and anger and legitimate gripes in the Palestinian/Occupied Territories for all attacks to halt completely. Yet if Hamas can stop all attacks from its own organization, there is hope.

Rome, here, again, offers guidance. Even with a Germanic chieftain "in charge" of a region bordering Roman territory, total control over all armed men in the area was rare. Armed bands of Germans, in the late empire or during early expansion (in the middle of the Empire's history, there the was a truly remarkable level of peace) might cross the border and raid Roman territory, killing villagers, pillaging, burning crops. They had no technical ability to lay siege or the numbers to lay siege, so much like a suicide bomber, their impact was far more psychological than material. A few dozen might be killed, but not more. Rome had several options, all of which were exercised at different times by different emperors and military governors, yielding different results. Rome could blame the ruler they had set up, and depose him or set up a punitive expedition to punish the whole region. A full scale minor war could ensue, or Rome could encourage one of its allies to attack. Often, Rome had living within its Empire the greatest rivals of these said leaders, so Rome could send them in with Roman support and have a Roman led coup (think the Shah of Iran or numerous examples in Latin America) if that leader did not play by the rules. More often than not, these events were isolated, and Rome recognized that it was silly for it to ask a relatively weak ruler who had no strong central government to be able to reign in every militant band. So Rome would sometimes send in a force to punish just the band of raiders, or might destroy the village that harbored them or from which the band originated, but would keep the violence localized; Rome would make its example and then withdraw, and the existing relationship between the local ruler, empowered by Rome, the people of the whole region, and Rome, would not be changed or adversely affected. Always, the number of Germans dying in the punitive raid was far more than the Romans who died in the first incursion, just like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: far more Palestinians are dead or wounded in this Intifada than Israelis. When Rome decided not to blame the weak government for the actions of every person living there and localized its response, the best results came about: stability and peace; even if another raid came about, a similar response would still occur. But when regional governors or Emperors seeking glory wanted to inflate the situation, they often sought a larger retribution than was required. If the entire local population was antagonized, full scale wars might erupt, and if a barbarian leader felt he was being treated unfairly, he may occasionally, though rarely, find support from neighboring peoples or rulers, especially if they had suffered similar treatment. Especially in the late Empire, this caused many problems as the Emperors of Late Antiquity became more despotic and removed from reality.

Sometimes, a rival group in a barbarian area might want to embarrass or destabilize the Roman-empowered local ruler: they may even hope that by raiding Roman territory Rome, rather than punish just them, would attack their whole group and area, that way they could rally support around themselves against Rome's puppet. Such examples are abound on the Palestinians side of today's situation, and more often than not, especially under Sharon, Hamas and others have succeeded in drawing Israel into destabilizing Fatah and the PA to Hamas's gain. Al-Qaeda, a group much worse than Fatah or Hamas by far, has succeeded all too well in doing this in with us and our allies in Afghanistan and in especially Iraq, and with Pakistanis against Musharaaf acting as our client; why else does he hold back from the tribal regions in the search for bin Laden?

What can give us hope is that, until the late, late Empire, these groups, after destabilizing and bringing war and usually defeat to their people, if these leaders were still alive, they almost always succeeded in renegotiating a new treaty and relationship with Rome, to be followed by a long period of peace and stability. Romans soldiers, just like American soldiers, wanted to be at home with their families and on their farms more than anything else, and once a level of violence was achieved that could enable both sides to achieve their goals (the new chieftain being empowered, Rome reestablishing trade and peace), everyone just wanted to go home. If Hamas can do this- and I believe there's a good chance, because unlike Fatah, their people's best interests are at the heart of what they are doing, at least compared to Fatah- peace could ensue. But Hamas must abolish its extremist actions, positions and rhetoric, and the burden of governance might help it to understand even more than it has already begun to in the past year the value of practicality. The Germanic groups, with Rome, were able to abandon their war rhetoric in favor of peace, so hopefully Hamas can too.

Another dilemma Romans faced was how powerful to make their clients: if they were too weak, like the today’s Palestinian Authority or, in their case, many German chieftains, peace, security, and stability could hardly be expected to be enforced by the weak ruler; yet if they were too strong, they could pose a threat (Pakistan in the future, the Germanic confederacies in the late empire) to Rome/America itself.

Yet even with strong allies, it was only Rome's mistreatment of its clients that led to major problems in their relations. What we must be worried about is America and Israel being true to their commitments. Especially with Mahmoud Abbas, Sharon's government did little to indicate it was going to follow through with its commitments: right up until the Gaza disengagement plan, settlement activity was still expanding. When Roman rulers flouted previous agreements and neglected its patron role in its client patron relationship, disaster ensued: ironically, it was such despotic leadership from a local Roman governor which encouraged the first Jewish rebellion against Rome in 66. A.D. In the cases of the barbarians, when a group had a legitimate gripe, it might unite with other similarly slighted groups. Such instances were rare, (Vercingetorix in Gaul, the Marcomanni, the Alemmannic confederation) but they were disastrous for Rome. (Today, we are facing a unifying of Islamic extremists that could be a disaster for us, but like Rome, this is symptomatic of a long term policy problem, in this case, supporting despots). Towards the end of the Empire, it was such neglect and abuse from Roman rulers towards barbarians and Rome's own civil wars that brought about its downfall. Rather than civil war, we are threatened by a bi-polar internal political struggle that makes our dependability in the view of our allies weak. What the Democrats may support in one agreement (Kyoto for example) may be flouted by a new administration under a new party, mostly likely the Republicans. Much like Rome looked at the barbarians as unreliable but in reality, its fickle emperor-system made the Romans themselves the more unreliable partner later in their history, America thinks its allies are unreliable, but the dictatorships and parliamentary democracies have often proved more stable in terms of consistency of policy than our fickle presidential political system. When America or Rome become become/became unreliable in the eyes of their allies, disaster and war followed. Yet just like the barbarians never gave up hope in Rome, our allies today won't totally quit on us even as our actions worry them. The Visigoths that sacked Rome in 410 AD only did so after years of seeking peaceful settlement in Rome's Empire and being forced into concentration camps and being denied food and sustenance; supplies were in short supply because of Roman civil wars. It was not the Barbarians that brought Rome down, but its own deceitful and barbarous conduct between Romans and towards their patrons.

When Rome failed as patron, the clients eventually rose up, but for the centuries that Rome honored its clients and did not fight too much amongst itself, peace and prosperity were the norm. We have much to learn from this. So do groups like Hamas. Our double standard of freedom and democracy for Whites and Europeans and despotic enslavement for Arabs and Africans have empowered the Islamic fundamentalists more than any other factor, and this goes far back into the history of colonialism; before Western intervention, religious extremists were on the fringe of Muslim society, but when their criticisms of the their governments for allowing western intervention rang true, their followings grew by leaps and bound. What started as Wahabism in colonial times is now seeing its most extreme manifestation in al-Qaeda. I want to remind everyone that when Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points were translated into Arabic, Palestinians and other Arabs in the Ottoman and European colonial worlds were dancing in the streets, feeling America would make good on its promises of freedom and democracy. What they got was colonial enslavement at hands of the West; our neglect of them in our client patron relationship has brought about our current problems in dealing with these people.

In the late Empire, when people in the frontier provinces felt that the Roman client-patron relationship no longer provided them security and peace, they looked to their own defense. The difference for us today is that Osama bin Laden, in this age of mass media, has emerged as the new patron. The Romans, even though they had mass publications, had a state monopoly on such publications; there was no barbarian press. Yet modern technology has empowered people like bin Laden in a way the Romans would not recognize. While parts of the Imperial system broke down all over the Empire and in Rome’s international dealings, starting a domino effect of lawlessness, disorder, and civil war for Rome to deal with, each movement that threatened Roman control and order was its own, a product of its own conditions; there was no mass movement even though Rome, ironically, tried to portray all barbarians as part of one large movement in official Imperial propaganda. So while America and Rome are seeing the same breakdown in their system, the response of the people being abandoned today is more unified, under al-Qaeda, than could ever have been in Roman times. Thus we see al-Qaeda spreading very quickly into Africa along with radical Islam. But even going back to 19th century colonialism, the Arabs and Muslims have always used mass media as a way to coalesce around particular movements. And while both Rome and America effectively used/use media to oversimplify their enemies, with the unintended consequence that few Romans or Americans understand much at all about the people with whom they dealt/deal, the media/unity factor on the barbarians’ end versus al-Qaeda’s end is the largest difference between what we are facing and what Rome was facing; and yet, if the a barbarian peoples had access to mass media, it is not inconceivable that they too could have had a Bin Laden and mass movement in their day. This would have been like much of the Muslim/Arab world today with America; different and disparate barbarian peoples had many similar and shared grievances with Rome and could realistically have united against Rome with such technology. Despite this major difference, there are, as stated, still many valuable lessons to be gleaned from Rome for us.

Going back to Hamas: al-Qaeda exists to bring about this type of conflict, Hamas sees conflict as a means to an end for its people (in a very basic sense the same way we see conflict), and Fatah could care less what was happening as long it got its money and power. Hamas, Israel, and America must reject their extreme tendencies in favor of practicality, something all three are capable of doing. Israel has abandoned (hopefully) its settler, Eretz-Yisrael policy, Hamas has, for the time being, moved away from terrorism and violence, and America is actually trying to redress its past failings as a patron by trying to promote democracy in the middle east, even though Bush’s miserable execution has all but doomed this attempt to failure.

Yet if Hamas resorts to terrorism again, it Israel empowers Netanyahu and if he resettles Gaza, if America abandons the Palestinians, or the Iraqis by withdrawing, we all stand to suffer greatly. Rome valued Peace, Prosperity, and Honor above all else: when it lost sight of these, it lost its dignity and lost its City and Empire. We must hope to not do the same. Do we, like the late emperors, become so detached that we no longer understand the repercussions of our actions? We are definitely in danger of doing so. While today we can look back and say that the Roman Empire fell in such-and-such a year, those living at the time had no concept of the "end" of their system. Well after we would say the Roman Empire ceased to exist, for decades if not centuries after, those people considered themselves Roman and drew their legitimacy from Rome and her traditions. Yet being Roman no longer meant what it once did. We need to ask what it means to be an American, and maintain our greatness or go the way of the Romans: existing as great in our minds only because of our failings to our networks of families at home and nations and peoples abroad

So while Bush may have the rhetoric of greatness down, he may be presiding over such a period of domestic and political decline that it may cease to matter what he or any politician says. Rome came back from several great periods of decline before eventually withering away, but it wasn't pretty: can we admit and confront the fact that we are in decline and do the same? Only time, and our own efforts, will tell.

# posted by Brian @ 9:34 PM 0 comments