Rome and the Barbarians, America and the Terrorists

by Brian E. Frydenborg

August 26^th, 2006

I recently finished reading this amazing book, Rome and the Barbarians, 100 B.C. – A.D. 400, by Thomas S. Burns, an academic at the University of South Carolina. I have included the publisher’s synopsis below to provide a good summary of the book:

Rome and the Barbarians, 100 B. C. - A. D. 400

SYNOPSIS

The barbarians of antiquity, so long fixed in Western imaginations as the savages who sacked and destroyed Rome, now emerge in this colorful, richly textured history as a much more complex—and far more interesting—factor in the expansion, and eventual unmaking, of the Roman Empire. Thomas S. Burns marshals an abundance of archeological and literary evidence, as well as three decades of study and experience, to bring forth a perceptive and wide-ranging account of the relations between Romans and non-Romans along the frontiers of Western Europe from the last years of the Republic into late antiquity.

Surveying a 500-year time span beginning with early encounters between barbarians and Romans around 100 B.C. and ending with the spread of barbarian settlement within the western Empire around A.D. 400, Burns removes the barbarians from their former narrow niche as invaders and conquerors and places them in the broader context of neighbors, (sometimes bitter) friends, and ultimately settlers and prospective Romans, themselves.

This nuanced history shows how Rome's relations with the barbarians—and vice versa—slowly but inexorably evolved from general ignorance, hostility, and suspicion toward tolerance, synergy, and integration. What he describes is, in fact, a drawn-out period of acculturation, characterized more by continuity than by change and conflict, leading to the creation of a new Romano-barbarian hybrid society and culture that anticipated the values and traditions of medieval civilization.

“Burns brings thirty years of extensive study of the literary and archaeological evidence to bear on the nature of the impact not only that the Romans had on the barbarians but also that the barbarians had on the Romans. Fortified with a thorough exposition of the source material, meticulous analysis, and provocative suggestions, Rome and the Barbarians will take the dialogue to another level." Ralph W. Mathisen, University of South Carolina

At first glace it may seem obscure, but until for most of the past 12 months, it was the in top three bestselling books in the ancient history category at bn.com, Barnes & Noble's website. It is still in the top ten. Its bargain price and its brilliance are just too much of a powerful combination. The book is all about the interaction and mutual influence between Rome and the “barbarian” cultures (mostly Germanic, Celtic, and the Steppe peoples, the Jews and Greeks, among others, could hardly have been considered barbarians at the time, they were too advanced). What is truly mind-blowing is how similar Rome's early expansion and then imperial dominance is to our own history, and how similar it was as a superpower to us as a superpower. I wouldn't have thought as much at first, but the author simply marshals too much evidence. And he does not usually make the connection to us: it is just obvious. But anyway, even at its height the Roman Empire often relied on familial client-patron relationships: There were hardly organized governments among the barbarians, so foreign policy often relied on Rome dealing with a warlord who was powerful enough to guarantee adherence to Rome's treaties and interests; if a candidate was not powerful enough to guarantee this adherence, then Rome propped them up so that they could, and it is terribly ironic that it was the Romans doing this that caused the different barbarian peoples to coalesce around a single leader and become the Franks, the Goths, the Alamanni... The "barbarian nations" would have stayed just simple and chaotic, disparate tribes without the patronage of Rome and the Roman desire to see a strong man in charge of a designated area, or group of people. Think about all our actions in South America during the Cold War, from Somoza to Pinochet to the killing of Ché, and before that, supporting Batista in Cuba. Think of the Saudi Royal Family (really, what kind of a "nation" is Saudi Arabia?) Think today about Musharraf: a perfect example. He is a warlord, we have no real relationship with Pakistan and its many different tribes, we operate wholly through Gen. Musharraf, and we help to keep his regime in power to ensure stability.

Despite the popular image of Rome, it was largely peaceful after its early centuries of expansion; after Augustus and his immediate successors in the first century AD, the borders of the Empire stayed pretty much the same, much like America's borders after Manifest Destiny had placated the "barbarian" native American tribes, after we had taken half of Mexico by force, stayed pretty much the same. Think of Spain and North Africa as the early expansion past the Appalachians, to the Mississippi; greater Greece, and eastern Turkey as Mexico, the rest of Turkey, Syria/Palestine/Judea, as the rest of the Great Plains up to the Rockies and the older settlements on the West Coast, and Egypt and Pannonia [the Balkans] as the far West, the rest of West Coast and the Southwest. Sure, there was some late expansion (Britain, Dacia [above the Danube], parts of the German frontier, some parts the Middle East like Mesopotamia/Iraq for Rome, and Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Cuba, Hawaii and Alaska and all the Pacific territories retained after world War II for us) but even Rome withdrew from many areas it had expanded into like Dacia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and the Black sea, at its height, just as we pulled back from Cuba, Okinawa, the Philippines, Panama, and, seemingly, Afghanistan/Iraq...

The cultural and societal similarities are what really blows your mind, though, in the book, but the point is this: that while it had its expansionist phases like we did, Rome was largely peaceful after it reached its peak, and usually only ended up fighting wars (with the exception of on-and-off Parthia/Persia, ironically West vs. East) when a new generation of barbarian leaders in one particular area no longer decided to play by the rules set up in past generations between Rome and the affected area. This was usually in the Germanic areas but also in the Balkans and in Britain. Rome often found it had to renegotiate new treaties when new leaders emerged, and war would come about if the leader was not willing to give Rome what it wanted. Going back to Musharraf, when he is gone in Pakistan, we will have to do much the same thing: renegotiate a new relationship when a new warlord emerges, and war may or may not ensue depending on the interests of both. Like our future and current wars, (think Saddam and Iraq too, actually) these were not wars of expansion for Rome, nor will they be wars of expansion for us: once a friendly, dependable government was set up, Rome almost always withdrew its troops, occasionally maintaining a few forts or outposts deep in enemy territory; think of our Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan today. There really was no Afghan nation, nor is there now, the difference is that we placed a leader in charge that we believe will be strong enough to ensure our interests are maintained, and already most of our troops are out of there. It was similar for Marcus Aurelius fighting the Germanic Marcomanni (as depicted in the opening of the movie Gladiator).

Rome gave so much power to these local rulers compared to what they had before interaction with Rome that the borders of the direct Empire were often meaningless: Rome never imposed its culture or way of life on people, it’s just that both were so attractive that people all over Rome's orbit were voluntarily drawn into it. Our border with Mexico, our relationship with Japan, are very similar cases to Rome's frontiers: American and Roman culture mixed with the local culture so that direct annexation was no longer necessary to maintain power and influence. And much like our relationships with our Allies, Roman frontier neighbors and client states received much, much more aid and stimulus coming from Rome than they paid in tribute to Rome; it was enough for Rome, like us, to reap the economic and status rewards.

To relate things to today’s era, and the Middle-East, in the Palestinian Territories, Arafat was a petty tribal chieftain in many ways, operating in the same manner that many of the petty Germanic warlords did with Rome: he, like the Germanics of Rome’s time, took the money, aid, and newfound position of status that Rome/America had elevated him/them to, and distributed the wealth and power among his/their followers and, to a lesser degree, to his/their people. The patron-client relationships between Israel/the EU/Russia/America/the UN and Arafat on one level, and the personal network that he set up which became known as Fatah, were very powerful, but only as powerful as the leader, Arafat. When he died, and even before then, the US saw a need to reassess the situation and put up a new ruler, which we may find more difficult now with Hamas in charge. So to be fair to Arafat, he was the latest in a long line of patron-client relationships. The "Palestinian people" much like the "Marcomanni" or the "Germans" didn't really exist until Rome or America propped up a leader and said "you are in charge of your people." In Rome's case it could take centuries or decades for this group of people to think of themselves as what it was called by Rome. In other words, the labels "Marcomanni" and "German" for the Romans, and the names "Palestinian" and "Saudi" and dare I say "Iraqi" for us Americans, had much more meaning for us and the Romans as a convenient way to label and organize people we deal/dealt with than for the people so being labeled.

Where Arafat can be judged, and judged harshly, is that he may have started in that old patron-client era, but now in the age of mass media, he could have risen to the task, was aware of what could have been done, and could have put his people first. But he never did: Fatah served to empower him and itself. Just like in Roman times, such leaders may have been popular (if they were too oppressive they were often deposed) but at their passing, the real problems would surface and turmoil would ensue. If Rome did not intervene directly, it had one of its clients intervene or it found a new leader who could guarantee stability. We are now doing the same thing in Palestinian Territories. Later in the Roman Empire, select allies occasionally had Roman arms and equipment, much like Israel does from us. And though the client would intervene, it was an extension of Rome's arm intervening for mutual interests. How different is Israel, intervening with M16's, F-16's, and Abrams tanks?

Now to Hamas: what inspires (in comparison to Fatah) and abhors about the group, this group that could, 50/50, be better or worse than Fatah, is interesting. The election for the Palestinians was a referendum on the status quo: continue the old, ridiculously corrupt patron-client networks of Fatah or reject that way of governance in lieu of an alternative with the people's interests at heart. Hamas has two faces: the Islamic charity started decades ago by students in Egypt to care for their Palestinian Arab brothers, which has done a better job providing for the Palestinian people than Arafat's Fatah ever did, even while Fatah was in charge, and the terror group that sends suicide bombers into Israeli discos. What is reassuring is that Hamas has dramatically reigned in its militant arm in the past two years: attacks against Israelis are way down from the beginning of the Intifada. Since it took over the Palestinian government, it has certainly avoided sending suicide bombers into Israel, and this can only be a positive development. There is too much chaos and anger and legitimate gripes in the Palestinian/Occupied Territories for all attacks to halt completely, but if Hamas can continue to prevent attacks from its own organization, which, for the most part is has, there is hope.

Rome, here, again, offers guidance. Even with a Germanic chieftain "in charge" of a region bordering Roman territory, total control over all armed men in the area was rare. Armed bands of Germans, in the late Empire or during early expansion (in the middle of the Empire's history, there was a truly remarkable level of peace) might cross the border and raid Roman territory, killing villagers, pillaging, burning crops. They had no technical ability to lay siege or the numbers to lay siege, so much like a suicide bomber, their impact was far more psychological than material. A few dozen might be killed, but not more. Rome had several options, all of which were exercised at different times by different emperors and military governors, yielding different results. Rome could blame the ruler they had set up, and depose him or set up a punitive expedition to punish the whole region. A full scale minor war could ensue, (as has happened recently with Israel and Hezbollah) or Rome could encourage one of its allies to attack. Often, Rome had living within its Empire the greatest rivals of these said leaders, so Rome could send them in with Roman support and have a Roman led coup (think the Shah of Iran or numerous examples in Latin America) if that leader did not play by the rules.

More often than not, these events were isolated, and Rome recognized that it was silly for it to ask a relatively weak ruler who had no strong central government to be able to reign in every militant band. So Rome would sometimes send in a force to punish just the band of raiders, or might destroy the village that harbored them or from which the band originated, but would keep the violence localized; Rome would make its example and then withdraw, and the existing relationship between the local ruler, empowered by Rome, the people of the whole region, and Rome, would not be changed or adversely affected. Always, the number of Germans dying in the punitive raid was far more than the Romans who died in the first incursion, just like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: far more Palestinians are dead or wounded in this Intifada than Israelis. The same can also be said of the recent Israeli-Hezbollah conflict. When Rome decided not to blame the weak government for the actions of every person living there and localized its response, the best results came about: stability and peace; even if another raid came about, a similar response would still occur. But when regional governors or Emperors seeking glory wanted to inflate the situation, they often sought a larger retribution than was required. If the entire local population was antagonized, full scale wars might erupt, and if a barbarian leader felt he was being treated unfairly, he may occasionally, though rarely, find support from neighboring peoples or rulers, especially if they had suffered similar treatment (at least part of the reason Hezbollah killed and captured a few Israeli soldiers was to show solidarity with their Arab Palestinian “brothers,” under siege in Gaza at the time). Especially in the late Empire, this caused many problems as the emperors of Late Antiquity became more despotic and removed from reality.

Sometimes, a rival group in a barbarian area might want to embarrass or destabilize the Roman-empowered local ruler: they may even hope that by raiding Roman territory Rome, rather than punish just them, would attack their whole group and area, that way these troublemakers could rally support around themselves against Rome's puppet. Such examples are abound on the Palestinians side of today's situation, and more often than not, especially under Sharon, Hamas and others have succeeded in drawing Israel into destabilizing Fatah and the PA to Hamas's gain. Al-Qaeda, a group much worse than Fatah or Hamas by far, has succeeded all too well in doing this in with us and our allies in Afghanistan and especially in Iraq, and with Pakistanis against Musharraf acting as our client; why else does he hold back from the tribal regions in the search for bin Laden?

Unfortunately, the recent fighting in Lebanon shows far too much of what I have mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. Ehud Olmert, new to power in Israel, was most probably seeking to assure Israelis that he could be just as tough, and protective, as Ariel Sharon, in addition to his legitimate reason of wanting to weaken Hezbollah and rescue captured Israeli soldiers. The disproportionate response, then, can be seen as an attempt not to go after glory, but an attempt to gain stature, a mold that would fit more than just a few emperors of Rome and their client-state leaders. By putting psychological domestic considerations over the real-world results of his actions, Olmert succeeded not in destroying Hezbollah but in destroying, or at least crippling, the nascent Lebanese democracy and in sidelining Lebanese moderates. He antagonized a population that had been willing to begin to put the past aside, so much so that now they support Hezbollah far, far more than they would have without Olmert’s blunder. The Israeli government’s actions were seen as terribly unfair to Lebanon and the Lebanese people, even after initial support. These neighbors, in a mixture of actually governmental aide and grassroots spontaneity, supported, eagerly and enthusiastically, both officially and unofficially, Hezbollah. This may have happened anyway, but the scale and enthusiasm was surely increased by the disproportionate response. Like Israel (and America in Iraq), Rome, too, could be oblivious to how its actions would make the situation worse, and what could start as a minor war could end up draining the Imperial Treasury and costing many Roman lives, though, as mentioned before, the barbarians would always suffer more, juts as Lebanon (and Iraq) is now devastated.

Conversely, just as barbarian warlords tried to provoke Rome into helping them destabilize rival barbarian leaders and to rally support around themselves, Hezbollah has humiliated Israel and increased its own stature at the expense of secular Lebanese democrats. In a worst case scenario, Hezbollah might succeed as Hamas did when it made Fatah’s people look weak enough that it was able to wrest control of the government from them. Thankfully, the Lebanese democracy is a far better organization that Fatah ever was, and is thus far more popular. Still, the extent of Hezbollah’s gain and the Lebanese government’s loss remains to be seen.

What can give us hope is that, until the late, late Empire, these groups, after destabilizing and bringing war and usually defeat to their people, if these leaders were still alive, almost always succeeded in renegotiating a new treaty and relationship with Rome, to be followed by a long period of peace and stability. Romans soldiers, just like American soldiers, wanted to be at home with their families and on their farms more than anything else, and once a level of violence was achieved that could enable both sides to achieve their goals (the new chieftain being empowered, Rome reestablishing trade and peace), everyone just wanted to go home. If Hamas can do this—and I believe there is a good chance, because unlike Fatah, their people's best interests are at the heart of what they are doing, at least compared to Fatah—peace could ensue. But Hamas must abolish its extremist actions, positions and rhetoric, and the burden of governance might help it to understand even more than it has already begun to in the past year the value of practicality. The Germanic groups, with Rome, were able to abandon their war rhetoric in favor of peace, so hopefully Hamas can too.

Another dilemma Romans faced was how powerful to make their clients: if they were too weak, like the today’s Palestinian Authority, the government of Lebanon or, in their case, many German chieftains, peace, security, and stability could hardly be expected to be enforced by the weak ruler; yet if they were too strong, they could pose a threat (Pakistan in the future, the Germanic confederacies in the late empire) to Rome/America itself. Another dimension of this problem involves allies. Israel, traditionally one of America’s strongest allies, has in recent years shown itself to be fully capable of disregarding its American patron’s concerns or advice regarding its actions, sometimes flouting them entirely. A sign of Rome’s waning power was when its allies started listening less and less to its counsel, and America needs to be careful that it does not lose too much power and influence with its allies, or it risks finding it far, far more difficult to achieve its international aspirations and policies. The UN and Europe with America is another obvious example.

Yet even with strong and loyal allies, it was only Rome's mistreatment of its clients that led to major problems in their relations. What we must be worried about is America and Israel being true to their commitments. As Chuck Hagel said on the Senate floor this July:

The United States will remain committed to defending Israel. Our relationship with Israel is a special and historic one. But, it need not and cannot be at the expense of our Arab and Muslim relationships. That is an irresponsible and dangerous false choice. Achieving a lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is as much in Israel’s interest as any other country in the world.

Especially with Mahmoud Abbas, but even before with Ahmed Qurei and Arafat, Sharon's government did little to indicate it was going to follow through with its commitments: right up until the Gaza disengagement plan, settlement activity was still expanding. When Roman rulers flouted previous agreements and neglected its patron role in its client patron relationship, disaster ensued. Ironically, it was such despotic leadership from a local Roman governor which encouraged the first Jewish rebellion against Rome in 66. A.D. In the cases of the barbarians, when a group had a legitimate gripe, it might unite with other similarly slighted groups. Such instances were rare, (Vercingetorix in Gaul, the Marcomanni, the Alemmannic confederation) but they were disastrous for Rome. (Today, we are facing a unifying of Islamic extremists that could be a disaster for us, but like Rome, this is symptomatic of a long term policy problem, in this case, supporting despots). Towards the end of the Empire, it was such neglect and abuse from Roman rulers towards barbarians and Rome's own civil wars that brought about its downfall. Rather than civil war, we are threatened by a bi-polar internal political struggle that makes our dependability in the view of our allies weak. What the Democrats may support in one agreement (Kyoto for example) may be flouted by a new administration under a new party, most likely the Republicans. Much like Rome looked at the barbarians as unreliable but in reality, its fickle emperor-system made the Romans themselves the more unreliable partner later in their history, America thinks its allies are unreliable, but the dictatorships and parliamentary democracies have often proved more stable in terms of consistency of policy than our fickle presidential political system. When America or Rome become become/became unreliable in the eyes of their allies, disaster and war followed. Yet just like the barbarians never gave up hope in Rome, our allies today will not totally quit on us even as our actions worry them. The Visigoths that sacked Rome in 410 A.D. only did so after years of seeking peaceful settlement in Rome's Empire and being forced into concentration camps and being denied food and sustenance; supplies were in short supply because of Roman civil wars. It was not the Barbarians that brought Rome down, but its own deceitful and barbarous conduct of Romans towards their patrons.

When Rome failed as patron, the clients eventually rose up, but for the centuries that Rome honored its clients and did not fight too much amongst itself, peace and prosperity were the norm. We have much to learn from this. So do groups like Hamas. Our double standard of freedom and democracy for Whites and Europeans and despotic enslavement for Arabs and Africans have empowered the Islamic fundamentalists more than any other factor, and this goes far back into the history of colonialism; before Western intervention, religious extremists were on the fringe of Muslim society, but when their criticisms of the their governments for allowing Western intervention rang true, their followings grew by leaps and bound. What started as Wahabism in colonial times is now seeing its most extreme manifestation in al-Qaeda. I want to remind everyone that when Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points were translated into Arabic, Palestinians and other Arabs in the Ottoman and European colonial worlds were dancing in the streets, feeling America would make good on its promises of freedom and democracy. What they got was colonial enslavement at hands of the West; our neglect of them in our client patron relationship has brought about our current problems in dealing with these people.

In the late Empire, when people in the frontier provinces felt that the Roman client-patron relationship no longer provided them security and peace, they looked to their own defense. The difference for us today is that Osama bin Laden, in this age of mass media, has emerged as the new patron. The Romans, even though they had mass publications, had a state monopoly on such publications; there was no barbarian press. Yet modern technology has empowered people like bin Laden in a way the Romans would not recognize. While parts of the imperial system broke down all over the Empire and in Rome’s international dealings, starting a domino effect of lawlessness, disorder, and civil war for Rome to deal with, each movement that threatened Roman control and order was its own, a product of its own conditions; there were no mass movements even though Rome, ironically, tried to portray all barbarians as part of one large movement in official imperial propaganda. So while America and Rome are seeing the same breakdown in their system, the response of the people being abandoned today is more unified, under al-Qaeda, than could ever have been in Roman times. Thus we see al-Qaeda spreading very quickly into Africa along with radical Islam. But even going back to 19th century colonialism, the Arabs and Muslims have always used mass media as a way to coalesce around particular movements. And while both Rome and America effectively used/use media to oversimplify their enemies, with the unintended consequence that few Romans or Americans understood/understand much at all about the people with whom they dealt/deal, the media/unity factor on the barbarians’ end versus al-Qaeda’s end is the largest difference between what we are facing and what Rome was facing; and yet, if the barbarian peoples had access to mass media, it is not inconceivable that they too could have had a bin Laden and a mass movement in their day. This would have been like much of the Muslim/Arab world today with America; different and disparate barbarian peoples had many similar and shared grievances with Rome and could realistically have united against Rome with such technology. Despite this major difference, there are, as stated, still many valuable lessons to be gleaned from Rome for us.

Going back to Hamas: al-Qaeda exists to bring about this type of conflict, Hamas sees conflict as a means to an end for its people (in a very basic sense the same way we see conflict), and Fatah could care less what was happening as long it got its money and power. Hamas, Israel, and America must reject their extreme tendencies in favor of practicality, something all three are capable of doing. Israel has abandoned (hopefully) its settler, Eretz-Yisrael policy, Hamas has, for the time being, moved away from terrorism and violence, and America is actually trying to redress its past failings as a patron by trying to promote democracy in the Middle-East, even though Bush’s miserable execution has actually made matters worse, at least for the time being.

Yet if Hamas resorts to terrorism again, and if Israel abandons its plan to withdraw from the West Bank or reoccupies Gaza, or empowers Netanyahu, if Hezbollah comes to power in Lebanon, if America abandons the Palestinians, or the Iraqis by withdrawing, we all stand to suffer greatly. Rome valued peace, prosperity, and honor above all else: when it lost sight of these, it lost its dignity and lost its City and Empire. We must hope to not do the same. Do we, like the late emperors and late Romans, become so detached that we no longer understand the repercussions of our actions? We are definitely in danger of doing so. While today we can look back and say that the Roman Empire fell in such-and-such a year, those living at the time had no concept of the "end" of their system. Well after we would say the Roman Empire ceased to exist, for decades if not centuries after, those people considered themselves Roman and drew their legitimacy from Rome and her traditions. Yet being Roman no longer meant what it once did. We need to ask what it means to be an American, and maintain our greatness or go the way of the Romans: existing as great in our minds only because of our failings to our networks of families at home and nations and peoples abroad

So while Bush may have the rhetoric of greatness down, he may be presiding over such a period of domestic and political decline that it may cease to matter what he or any politician says. Rome came back from several great periods of decline before eventually withering away, but it was not pretty: can we admit and confront the fact that we are in decline and do the same? Only time, and our own efforts, will tell.

Inquiry Opened Into Israeli Use of U.S. Bombs

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24 — The State Department is investigating whether Israel’s use of American-made cluster bombs in southern Lebanon violated secret agreements with the United States that restrict when it can employ such weapons, two officials said.

The investigation by the department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls began this week, after reports that three types of American cluster munitions, anti-personnel weapons that spray bomblets over a wide area, have been found in many areas of southern Lebanon and were responsible for civilian casualties.

Gonzalo Gallegos, a State Department spokesman, said, “We have heard the allegations that these munitions were used, and we are seeking more information.” He declined to comment further.

Several current and former officials said that they doubted the investigation would lead to sanctions against Israel but that the decision to proceed with it might be intended to help the Bush administration ease criticism from Arab governments and commentators over its support of Israel’s military operations. The investigation has not been publicly announced; the State Department confirmed it in response to questions.

In addition to investigating use of the weapons in southern Lebanon, the State Department has held up a shipment of M-26 artillery rockets, a cluster weapon, that Israel sought during the conflict, the officials said.

The inquiry is likely to focus on whether Israel properly informed the United States about its use of the weapons and whether targets were strictly military. So far, the State Department is relying on reports from United Nations personnel and nongovernmental organizations in southern Lebanon, the officials said.

David Siegel, a spokesman for the Israeli Embassy, said, “We have not been informed about any such inquiry, and when we are we would be happy to respond.”

Officials were granted anonymity to discuss the investigation because it involves sensitive diplomatic issues and agreements that have been kept secret for years.

The agreements that govern Israel’s use of American cluster munitions go back to the 1970’s, when the first sales of the weapons occurred, but the details of them have never been publicly confirmed. The first one was signed in 1976 and later reaffirmed in 1978 after an Israeli incursion into Lebanon. News accounts over the years have said that they require that the munitions be used only against organized Arab armies and clearly defined military targets under conditions similar to the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973.

A Congressional investigation after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon found that Israel had used the weapons against civilian areas in violation of the agreements. In response, the Reagan administration imposed a six-year ban on further sales of cluster weapons to Israel.

Israeli officials acknowledged soon after their offensive began last month that they were using cluster munitions against rocket sites and other military targets. While Hezbollah positions were frequently hidden in civilian areas, Israeli officials said their intention was to use cluster bombs in open terrain.

Bush administration officials warned Israel to avoid civilian casualties, but they have lodged no public protests against its use of cluster weapons. American officials say it has not been not clear whether the weapons, which are also employed by the United States military, were being used against civilian areas and had been supplied by the United States. Israel also makes its own types of cluster weapons.

But a report released Wednesday by the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center, which has personnel in Lebanon searching for unexploded ordnance, said it had found unexploded bomblets, including hundreds of American types, in 249 locations south of the Litani River.

The report said American munitions found included 559 M-42’s, an anti-personnel bomblet used in 105-millimeter artillery shells; 663 M-77’s, a submunition found in M-26 rockets; and 5 BLU-63’s, a bomblet found in the CBU-26 cluster bomb. Also found were 608 M-85’s, an Israeli-made submunition.

The unexploded submunitions being found in Lebanon are probably only a fraction of the total number dropped. Cluster munitions can contain dozens or even hundreds of submunitions designed to explode as they scatter around a wide area. They are very effective against rocket-launcher units or ground troops.

The Lebanese government has reported that the conflict killed 1,183 people and wounded 4,054, most of them civilians. The United Nations reported this week that the number of civilian casualties in Lebanon from cluster munitions, land mines and unexploded bombs stood at 30 injured and eight killed.

Dozen of Israelis were killed and hundreds wounded in attacks by Hezbollah rockets, some of which were loaded with ball bearings to maximize their lethality.

Officials say it is unlikely that Israel will be found to have violated a separate agreement, the Arms Export Control Act, which requires foreign governments that receive American weapons to use them for legitimate self-defense. Proving that Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah did not constitute self-defense would be difficult, especially in view of President Bush’s publicly announced support for Israel’s action after Hezbollah fighters attacked across the border, the officials said.

Even if Israel is found to have violated the classified agreement covering cluster bombs, it is not clear what actions the United States might take.

In 1982, delivery of cluster-bomb shells to Israel was suspended a month after Israel invaded Lebanon after the Reagan administration determined that Israel “may” have used them against civilian areas.

But the decision to impose what amounted to a indefinite moratorium was made under pressure from Congress, which conducted a long investigation of the issue. Israel and the United States reaffirmed restrictions on the use of cluster munitions in 1988, and the Reagan administration lifted the moratorium.

Human Rights Group Accuses Israel of War Crimes in Lebanon

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Aug. 23 — Amnesty International accused Israel on Wednesday of war crimes in its monthlong battle with Hezbollah, saying its bombing campaign amounted to indiscriminate attacks on Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure and population.

“Many of the violations examined in this report are war crimes that give rise to individual criminal responsibility,” Amnesty International, the London-based human rights group, said in a report on the Israeli campaign. “They include directly attacking civilian objects and carrying out indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks.”

“During more than four weeks of ground and aerial bombardment by the Israeli armed forces, the country’s infrastructure suffered destruction on a catastrophic scale,” the report said, contending that this was “an integral part of the military strategy.”

“Israeli forces pounded buildings into the ground,” the report went on, “reducing entire neighborhoods to rubble and turning villages and towns into ghost towns as their inhabitants fled the bombardments.

“Main roads, bridges and petrol stations were blown to bits. Entire families were killed in airstrikes on their homes or in their vehicles while fleeing the aerial assaults on their villages. Scores lay buried beneath the rubble of their houses for weeks, as the Red Cross and other rescue workers were prevented from accessing the areas by continuing Israeli strikes.”

Mark Regev, the spokesman for Israel’s Foreign Ministry, categorically rejected the claim that Israel had “acted outside international norms or international legality concerning the rules of war.” Unlike Hezbollah, he said, Israel did not target the civilian population, nor did it indiscriminately target Lebanese civilian infrastructure.

He added: “Our job was made very difficult by the fact that Hezbollah adopted a deliberate policy of positioning itself inside civilian areas and breaking the first fundamental distinction under the rules of war, by deliberately endangering civilians. Under the rules of war, you are legally entitled to target infrastructure that your enemy is exploiting for its military campaign.”

Citing a variety of sources, the Amnesty International report said Israel’s air force had carried out more than 7,000 air attacks, while the navy had fired 2,500 shells. The human toll, according to Lebanese government statistics, was estimated at 1,183 deaths, mostly civilians, about a third of them children; 4,054 wounded; and 970,000 people displaced, out of a population of a little under four million.

“Statements from the Israeli military officials seem to confirm that the destruction of the infrastructure was indeed a goal of the military campaign,” the report said. It said that “in village after village the pattern was similar: the streets, especially main streets, were scarred with artillery craters along their length. In some cases, cluster bomb impacts were identified.”

“Houses were singled out for precision-guided missile attacks and were destroyed, totally or partially, as a result,” the report said. “Business premises such as supermarkets or food stores and auto service stations and petrol stations were targeted.

“With the electricity cut off and food and other supplies not coming into the villages, the destruction of supermarkets and petrol stations played a crucial role in forcing local residents to leave.”

The Amnesty International report said the widespread destruction of apartments, houses, electricity and water services, roads, bridges, factories and ports, in addition to several statements by Israeli officials, suggested a policy of punishing the Lebanese government and the civilian population in an effort to get them to turn against Hezbollah.

“The evidence strongly suggests that the extensive destruction of public works, power systems, civilian homes and industry was a deliberate and integral part of the military strategy rather than collateral damage,” the report said.

It also noted a statement from the Israeli military chief of staff, Lt. Gen Dan Halutz, calling Hezbollah a “cancer” that Lebanon must get rid of “because if they don’t, their country will pay a very high price.”

The Amnesty International report came as a number of international aid and human rights agencies used the current lull in fighting to assess the damage.

The United Nations Development Program said the attacks had obliterated most of the progress Lebanon had made in recovering from the devastation of the civil war years. “Fifteen years of work have been wiped out in a month,” Jean Fabre, a spokesman for the organization in Geneva, told reporters.

Another urgent issue, aid groups say, is the number of unexploded bomblets from cluster bombs littering the southern villages. Tekimiti Gilbert, the operations chief of a United Nations mine removal team, told reporters in Tyre: “Up to now there are at least 170 cluster bomb strikes in south Lebanon. It’s a huge problem. There are obvious dangers with people, children, cars. People are tripping over these things.”

United Nations officials say at least five children have been killed by picking up the bomblets scattered about by the cluster bombs.

Despite the cease-fire, southern Lebanon remained tense on Wednesday. Three Lebanese soldiers were killed trying to defuse a rocket that had not exploded. An Israeli soldier was killed and two others wounded when, according to the Israeli military, they walked over a minefield that Israel had previously buried.

The Israeli military also said it had fired artillery rounds from the disputed territory of Shabaa Farms to the Lebanese village of Shabaa. There were no reports of casualties.

Greg Myre contributed reporting from Jerusalem for this article.

Mayor Bloomberg Unveils Monument to ‘Fighting 69th’

BALLYMOTE, Ireland (AP) -- New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg unveiled a memorial Tuesday in honor of the "Fighting 69th," a famous U.S. Army regiment with Irish-American roots that has lost 19 members in Iraq.

Bloomberg was the key guest of honor at an outdoor ceremony in the village of Ballymote, where the memorial -- a steel column composed partly of metal salvaged from the remains of the World Trade Center -- was shown to several hundred dignitaries and guests.

The choice of Ballymote, in western Ireland's County Sligo, reflected the fact that the commander of the 69th Infantry Regiment during the American Civil War, Brigadier Gen. Michael Corcoran, was raised in Ballymote.

In his speech, Bloomberg praised the regiment's record of valor and sacrifice in combat since its debut in the Civil War. As part of the Army of the Potomac it fought in major battles, including the disastrous First Battle of Bull Run in 1861, Antietam in 1982, where it suffered nearly 60 percent casualties at the "Sunken Road," and the watershed Battle of Gettysburg in 1863.

As part of the U.S. army's 42nd (Rainbow) Division, the Manhattan-based regiment saw action in World Wars I and II and most recently in Iraq, where Bloomberg noted 19 of its members have been killed: 10 from New York and nine from Louisiana.

"The Fighting 69th has always answered the call to defend and protect America and on Sept. 11, 2001, the call they answered was a local one. On New York City's darkest day, the members of the Fighting 69th were one of the first military units to respond to the attacks," Bloomberg said.

"We have been deeply moved by the supreme sacrifices its recent members have made. ... Today we honor all of them."

The 69th was founded in 1851 in New York City, composed chiefly of recent immigrants from Ireland, who had fled the devastating Great Potato Famine of that time. Its enduring importance to Irish-Americans is demonstrated every March 17, when members lead the city's annual St. Patrick's Day parade.

About a dozen protesters representing a group called the Sligo Anti-War Coalition picketed Tuesday's ceremony, but police cordoned them off several hundred yards away. They waved placards and banners denouncing Israel's recent retaliatory attack against Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon and Bloomberg's support for it, as well as the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Protest leader Tim Mulcahy said the group supported the monument but wanted a U.S. politician opposed to the Iraq and Lebanon attacks to unveil it.

Mulcahy noted that U.S. President John F. Kennedy brought a "Fighting 69th" regimental banner to Ireland in 1963, and said the late president's younger brother, Sen. Edward Kennedy, "would have been a lovely choice to come to Ballymote to finish the job."

Police also barred the protesters from a later luncheon and reception in Sligo Town Hall.

There, Bloomberg said he supported efforts to legalize an estimated 50,000 Irish living illegally in the United States, and to boosting the number of work visas issued by the United States to Irish citizens.

"I know there are many Irish-born New Yorkers who are caught in the trap of our federal immigration policies," he said. "If we're going to continue to attract the brightest and the best to the United States -- and Ireland has more than its fair share -- we need to inject some common sense into our immigration laws."